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ABSTRACT
There is a tendency to consider covert networks as separate from
overt networks. Drawing on data from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, we demonstrate that this is not the case and identify
how covert and overt networks are mutually constitutive. While
most studies of African brokers have relied on network metaphors
like ‘Big Men’ and ‘social membranes’, we consider the embedd-
edness of ‘covert’ networks in ‘overt’ networks explicitly. We per-
form two analyses on a large original dataset encompassing 396
partially overlapping ego-nets obtained from a hybrid link-tracing
design. An ego-net analysis reveals a large degree of homophily
and a deep embeddedness of the diﬀerent networks. A multilevel
exponential random graph model ﬁtted to the reconstructed net-
work of a 110-node subset shows that demobilised combatants
are the actors likely to broker between armed groups, state forces,
and civilian blocs, suggesting their capacity to broker peace or
foment war.
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Introduction
People living in conﬂict-aﬀected states are often faced with constantly changing terri-
torial and political control as it is challenged and negotiated between representatives of
‘the state’, armed groups, and a host of other actors and organisations. Despite this
volatility, they somehow survive. This paper investigates the socio-economic connec-
tions that facilitate their survival in however dire circumstances. It aims to identify the
individuals who broker between contesting state and non-state groups and organisa-
tions; whose activities hover on a spectrum between licit and illicit, legal and illegal,
oﬃcial and non-oﬃcial, covert and overt. Their interventions often determine whether
conﬂict escalates to war or diﬀuses to tentative peace.
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Interventions in the form of ‘disruption’ have received a lot of attention in the
literature on covert networks.1 While some recognise the limits of identifying points
of disruption through centrality measures,2 the majority of research limits the notion
of disruption to identifying central actors. More consequentially and with very few
exceptions,3 covert networks are considered in isolation and the eﬀectiveness of
disruption is not contingent on how the covert network is embedded in overt
networks.
The literature stipulates that where formal state institutions are dysfunctional or pre-
datory, informal social support networks, already crucial to social cohesion, become ever
more important in securing livelihoods and protection.4 Yet, in eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo (henceforth the Congo),5 such personal support networks may involve state
actors, such as military oﬃcers, acting according to non-oﬃcial logics and sometimes
engaging in illegal activities.6 As a result, the state/non-state divide does not correspond
to the formal/informal dichotomy. In addition, illegal activities perceived as providing socio-
economic, political, or physical security are often considered ‘licit’.7 This also applies to the
activities of non-state armed groups, which are closely interwoven with local populations –
many people have a brother, cousin, uncle, former classmate or colleague, co-villager or co-
religionist serving in an armed group.8 Hence, the networks under consideration herein –
which following Callaghy we term ‘brokerage networks’9 – are not easily classiﬁed in
dichotomous terms (illicit, informal, criminal).10 Moreover, they do not discriminate between
nodes that are civilians, state representatives, or warlords. Our research questions are: how
can we characterise diﬀerent actors’ access to diﬀerent resources (like jobs, information, and
emotional support) and thereby identify the mechanisms whereby actors bridge diﬀerent
layers of society?
To analyse how brokerage networks are conﬁgured and structure socio-economic life, we
draw on primary data from the Congo. The key units of analysis for the study were 396
respondents recruited using a hybrid link-tracing design. Participant-aided sociograms11 were
used both as a tool to recruit subsequent respondents and to ascertain social ties between
respondents’ alters and those alters’ characteristics. We interrogate our research questions in
two parts. A ﬁrst analysis deﬁnesmultilevel measures of tie- and alter-dispersion and egocentric
network (ego-net) homophily by respondent category for all ego-nets. The second analysis
performs a complete network analysis on a subset of nodes for which (some) alter-alter ties are
available, allowing us to statistically test network mechanisms while simultaneously controlling
for competing factors. The multilevel exponential random graph model12 of the second part
relies on a Bayesian data-augmentation scheme to account for the sampling design.
The paper is structured as follows: we ﬁrst set the scene with a brief historical background
of violent conﬂict in the Congo to contextualise the study; we then provide an account of the
study design and data collection approach. Following basic descriptives of the dataset, we
subsequently investigate the diﬀerent measures of group-category positions based on the
ego-nets. After identifying some limitations associatedwith analyses of brokerage for sampled
networks, we present a framework for analysing partially observed networks and apply it to
a subset of the data. We conclude by discussing our results and their implications for under-
standing dynamics of conﬂict in the region and the characteristics of brokers positioned to
mediate or exacerbate violence.
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Historical background
War and armed conﬂict have marked the Congo throughout its tumultuous history. In
recent decades, the most notorious episodes of armed conﬂict include the First
(1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars. These wars followed in the wake
of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, which claimed the lives of nearly a million people and
rendered another million refugees in the Congo13 (then called Zaïre). These predomi-
nantly Hutu refugees’ militarisation and subsequent attacks on Rwanda and Congolese
citizens prompted the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the politico-military movement
that constituted the Rwandan government, to invade Zaïre in 1996, setting in motion
events culminating in two regional wars. The Second Congo War embroiled nine African
countries and dozens of Congolese and foreign armed groups. While a peace agreement
adopted in 2003 formally ended the war, ﬁghting has continued in the country’s volatile
east, where state and non-state armed actors hold sway over diﬀerent spheres of social
life – including politics, the economy, and conﬂict regulation.
One reason for the protractedness of violent conﬂict in the east is the complex enmeshing of
regional, national, and local conﬂict dynamics.14 In addition to regional involvement, and
national power struggles, war has been driven by a long history of inter and intra-communal
tensions, often related to contestations around territory, local authority, and citizenship that are
expressed in (ethnic) identity-based terms.15 The geographical epicentre of many of these
conﬂicts has been the Kivu provinces bordering Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. This study
focuses predominantly onNorth Kivu’sMasisi and Rutshuru Territories (sub-provincial divisions).
The Belgian colonial administration (1908–1960) resettled Rwandans (ﬁrst Tutsi, then
Hutu) in Masisi and later Rutshuru from the 1930s through 1956.16 These immigrants –
known as Banyarwanda (a category also including Hutu and Tutsi living on what is now
Congolese soil before the colonial era, like the Banyabwisha) – displaced resident Hunde
from what they considered to be their ancestral grounds, became the demographic
majority, and in some contexts dominated local governance.17 Violent clashes over land
access and political control erupted for the ﬁrst time just after independence during the
so-called Guerre de Kanyarwanda.18 While violence soon subsided, tensions would
intensify again in the 1970s and 1980s, as prosperous Banyarwanda acquired colonial-
era plantations through changes in property laws, thereby dispossessing poor farmers.19
By the late 1980s, as a transition towards multi-party democracy loomed on the horizon,
political leaders increasingly manipulated ethnicity and conﬂicts around land and local
authority to secure constituencies.20 Concomitantly, local communities established their
own militias for protection; some of these were supported by local self-help organisa-
tions organised along ethnic lines and known as mutuelles, such as the Banyarwanda-
linked MAGRIVI (Mutuelle des Agriculteurs des Virunga).21 Others, in particular groups later
known as Mayi-Mayi, linked to the Hunde and Tembo ethnic groups,22 had their roots in
independence-era rebellions as well as precolonial and colonial-era cults and initiation
societies.23 The arrival of over a million Rwandan refugees – including government
oﬃcials, soldiers, and perpetrators – ﬂeeing the genocide in 1994 and the new RPF
regime that took over in its wake reinvigorated these militias on all sides.
Threatened by raids from the militarised refugee camps, the RPF cobbled together
a Congolese-regional rebellion, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du
Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). Led by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed forces of the RPF
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regime, the AFDL invaded eastern Zaïre and ousted its president Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997.
Discontent with the policies of the new president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, his erstwhile backers
Rwanda and Uganda started a new rebellion in 1998 to remove him from power, the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). Similar to the AFDL, Congolese Tutsi and
Hutu played an important role in the RCD, seeing it as vehicle to secure political and economic
inﬂuence in the face of a long history of political exclusion.24 In the course of the ensuing war,
Kabila allied with aﬃliates and members of the former (Hutu-dominated) government of
Rwanda, including the army, which had arrived in 1994 and had since remobilised. These forces
formed a politico-military movement that would become known in 2000 as the Forces
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR).25
The peace accord adopted in 2003 stipulated that all ex-belligerents had to either disband
their armedwings or integrate them into the newnational army, Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). In Masisi and Rutshuru, ex-RCD troops came to formally
constitute brigades of the FARDC but refused to redeploy or be mixed with other troops.
These brigades became the backbone of a new rebellion in 2006 known as theCongrès National
pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) whose leadership, like that of the RCD, was dominated by
Congolese Tutsi. Its formal goals were combatting the Rwandan Hutu-dominated FDLR, repa-
triating Congolese Tutsi from Rwanda, and overthrowing President Kabila.26On 23March 2009,
the CNDP’s rebellion formally ended as they had integrated their troops into the FARDC.
However, within the FARDC, they maintained parallel chains of command, revenue, and
intelligence. This facilitated the desertion of a discontented wing of the ex-CNDP from the
FARDC in 2012 and heralded the start of a new rebellion, the M23, named after the 23 March
accord it claimedhadnot been respected.M23’s demise coincidedwithwhat is locally knownas
the 2013 ‘Mudahunga War’ or ‘Guerre de Kitshanga’ between, on the one hand, FARDC
dominated by Rwandophones (as Banyarwanda are now called) and, on the other hand, the
Hunde Mayi-Mayi militia Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS) led by
commander Janvier Buingo Karairi.27 Each of these rebellions were territorially rooted in the
areas that are the focus of our study (see Figure 1).
Both Masisi and Rutshuru reﬂect wider trends in the armed group landscape across
eastern Congo, namely a process of fragmentation due to the scattering and splintering
of larger politico-military movements and the proliferation of smaller scale armed
groups often formed by army deserters.29 In 2008, a large peace conference that
gathered all armed groups active in the Kivus concluded with a cessation of hostilities,
which was signed by 23 groups (some of which were even created for the occasion).30
Between 2015 and 2018, the approximate count of armed groups rose from 70 to over
120 [sic].31 To illustrate the network of positive and negative ties among a subset of
these armed groups operating in and around Masisi and Rutshuru, we diagrammed
these ties (Figure 2) for a number of groups, based on studies by Baﬁlemba and Mueller,
and Vogel,32 and in consultation with Mueller and Vogel.33
The sociogram in Figure 2 represents a snapshot of a moment in time: the alliances
and enmity between these groups as of 2 August 2013. This particular conﬁguration is
the product of years of change and realignment, as groups were rebranded and
rechristened, merged and split, were integrated into the national army and subsequently
broke from it.34 Since 2013, the kaleidoscope has shifted and reshaped countless times
over; the landscape is continuously changing. Now, as then, eastern Congo remains
a complex and highly network-dependent context.
4 P. STYS ET AL.
Research design and data collection35
Following expert reviews of the methods and instruments and cognitive interviews,
a pilot study was undertaken as part of later data collection.36 ‘Participation’ in armed
groups was disaggregated into being civilian members, militarily trained members, and
leaders/founders. Civilians’ aﬃliations ranged from not knowing anyone in armed
groups, knowing some members, and supporting armed groups as non-members.
Participants were members of covert and hard-to-reach populations and social structure
was crucial to our investigation. Thus, starting with a seed set determined in consulta-
tion with local experts and based on desired target groups,37 we grew the sample using
Figure 1. RCD, CNDP, M23 rebellions: Main areas of armed group territorial control/inﬂuence.28
Figure 2. Alliances (black) and enmity (grey) ties (left) and predecessor to successor/splinter (right)
between armed groups in and around Rutshuru and Masisi territories as of August 2013. Node size
of armed group is proportional to approximate troop numbers (apart from FARDC).
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a link-tracing design.38 Subsequent participants were recruited based on the contacts of
previous ones. Not all the nominees were followed up and interviewed (which would
have been the case with a snowball sample), but network data was collected on all
respondents (which would not have typically been the case with respondent-driven
sampling); the sampling method was a hybrid design. A by-product of this design was
a partially observed, multilevel network consisting of partially overlapping ego-nets.39
Network ties
Personal support networks were delineated using the exchange approach.40 Based on
the theory of social exchange, the approach assumes that ‘people who are sources of
rewarding interactions will be particularly important in shaping respondents’ attitudes
and behaviours’.41 Social support, following Thoits, is deﬁned as ‘helpful functions
performed for an individual by signiﬁcant others such as family members, friends, co-
workers, relatives, and neighbours’.42 Speciﬁed interactions are instances of social sup-
port and thus pre-eminently suitable for delineating personal support networks.
Likewise, interactions are very speciﬁc and likely to be interpreted in the same way by
all respondents. To account for potentially supportive relationships in which no recent
supportive interactions occurred, interactions were not temporally bound. The three
dimensions of instrumental support, social companionship, and emotional support were
operationalized by asking about ‘loans’ and ‘work/jobs’, ‘visiting/spending recreational
time together’, and ‘advice with a major change in your life, like changing jobs or
moving to another area’, respectively.
Network ties were elicited through participant-aided sociograms,43 using whiteboards
and markers to diagram ego-nets. Participants drew their personal support networks,
discussed ego-alter and alter-alter ties, and grouped their nominations by drawing
circles around alters. Alters elicited through the three name generators were not
mutually exclusive. The pilot demonstrated that emotional support does not occur
without social companionship, which respondents conceptualised using the term ‘raﬁki
proche’44 (‘close friend’, drawing on Swahili and French).
Basic descriptives
Egos and alters
Figure 3 provides a representation of the sample and sampling design for a subset of
data (a semi-supervised entity resolution scheme has been applied). The network dia-
gram is partial in that the alter-alter ties are not displayed. Nodes clearly cluster around
speciﬁc organisations, represented by blue squares in the ﬁgure. We can symbolically
denote the one-mode, person-to-person network by the adjacency matrix A ¼ aij
 
,
(i; j 2 V). We can further represent the membership in diﬀerent armed groups as
a person-by-armed group aﬃliation matrix B ¼ bijð Þ, (i 2 V , j 2 G). Many armed groups
were founded predominantly to protect their communities from other armed groups’
attacks, which can be represented by inter-organisational ties. Here, we address ties of
a positive nature such as alliances and co-operation and collect these in an organisation-
by-organisation adjacency matrix D ¼ dij
 
(i; j 2 G).
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Men comprise about 60 per cent of 396 respondents (egos). Half of these respondents
are militarily active (combatants), serving in state security forces and non-state armed
groups; about a third are demobilised combatants who now lead civilian lives, including
those who auto-demobilised and those who participated in formal demobilisation
programmes.45 The minority are civilians, yet only in this category women outnumber men.
The vast majority aremultilingual; we used respondents’ ﬁrst language (mother tongue) as
a proxy for their ethnicity (e.g. ‘Rwandophone’46 for those speakingKinyarwanda, Kinyabwisha,
and other dialects; ‘Kihunde’ for those who speak Kihunde and belong to the Hunde group,
etc.). Like nationalism, ethnicity is a form of collective identiﬁcation and belonging rooted in
the invention of shared history, culture, and language,47 which in the Congo provides
opportunities for political and armed mobilisation.48 As evidenced in the second section,
ethnicity in this case was politicised and compounded with socio-economic status and
nationality.49
Figure 3. Example of three chains for a subset of the dataset (207 respondents, 1,086 alters, no alter-
alter ties). Respondents (red nodes), non-interviewed alters (gold nodes), and key aﬃliation nodes
(blue squares). The sample paths (red) for three seed nodes (red squares) are indicated.
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Respondents represent seven language groups. The sampled population is overwhel-
mingly Hunde and Rwandophone, the next largest group being Lingala-speakers (pre-
dominantly military from western Congo), who are almost all men. Notably, there are
very few Rwandophone civilians. Hunde, in terms of subgroups, have the greatest
proportion of militarily active men.
The sample represents 25 past and present armed groups, evoking the complexity of
militarised networks illustrated in Figure 2. The vast majority of demobilised combatants
were members of multiple armed groups, having undergone cycles of mobilisation,
demobilisation, and remobilisation, as well as re-aﬃliation due to splits, mergers,
rebranding, or actually changing membership.
About half of the respondents have been members of the RCD rebellion active during
the Second Congo War. CNDP and Mayi-Mayi Janvier (current APCLS leader Janvier’s
group before forming the APCLS) were the next most popular groups in terms of
membership, followed by APCLS. Demobilised combatants who had participated in
the AFDL (the rebellion that kickstarted the First Congo War in 1996), RCD (1998–2003),
CNDP (its successor, 2004/5–2009), and the RPA (the armed wing of the RPF rebellion
and then regime) are predominantly Rwandophone. Similarly, membership of Mayi-Mayi
Janvier, APCLS, Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua, and PARECO (umbrella militia group into which
Janvier integrated in 2007 and from which his APCLS split) was mainly Hunde.
Overwhelmingly, and referring to the historical background above, rapport between
the groups in which the two communities participated was vitriolic and antagonistic. No
armed group, however, was mono-ethnic.
Considering the composition of active armed groups in the area, based on their
members’ language groups, the conclusions are in line with the narrative of inter-group
conﬂict presented above.50 Like in the 1960s and 1990s, combatants from the area’s two
dominant language groups constitute opposing factions. Hunde comprise the vast
majority of the APCLS, a non-state armed group, whilst Rwandophones dominate the
FARDC and PNC, respectively the national army and police. Prior to integration into
these state forces, many were members of RCD and CNDP, against which APCLS (and
PARECO and Mayi-Mayi Janvier before it) mobilised. However, there is an opportunity for
some Hunde and Rwandophone rank-and-ﬁle combatants to ﬁght together in these
groups, be it contrary to the dominant tendencies of their respective communities and
top leadership.
Civilians, demobilised, and active combatants’ income-generating activities are not
mutually exclusive. Most respondents pursue various types of work simultaneously or
seasonally to secure their livelihoods – even soldiers and police oﬃcers. Respondents
mentioned 44 diﬀerent vocations in interviews. Main income-generating activities in the
area are, for the most part, pursued by both sexes, Rwandophone and Hunde alike
(Figure 4). Whilst soldiering or police work may exacerbate inter-communal tensions
(considering the ethno-linguistic composition of dominant armed groups),51 farming
and varied and sporadic short-term work are all forms of employment in which
Rwandophones and Hunde may collaborate – civilians and former and current comba-
tants. Militarily active Hunde’s occupational portfolios are more diversiﬁed than those of
Rwandophones. Local alcohol production appears to be dominated by militarily active
and demobilised women and the sex trade by the latter. Demobilised men cited
prolonged unemployment more often than any other subgroup.
8 P. STYS ET AL.
Ego-net analysis
In terms of access to, or brokerage between, diﬀerent armed groups, the descriptions of
egos’ actor attributes illustrate ethno-linguistic variations between diﬀerent groups,
reﬂecting eastern Congo’s history of inter-group conﬂict. Additionally, brokerage is likely
associated with livelihoods and access to resources. Here we investigate these dynamics
through social interactions between respondents and their alters.
Methods
The rich literature on leadership and brokerage roles in covert networks,52 with few
exceptions,53 identiﬁes central actors by calculating standard network metrics on
a network (assumed to be completely observed).54 Individual actors are then typically
investigated to ascertain the reasons for their centrality and the possible network
consequences of their position.55
From the perspective that network ties are instrumental and reﬂect organisational
capabilities, centrality and reach in covert networks have particular importance for the
so-called eﬃciency/security trade-oﬀ.56 On the one hand, one would expect individuals
to minimise the risks associated with creating and maintaining ties but on the other, for
operational reasons, communication and collaboration in the covert network needs to
be eﬃcient and eﬀective. Some have even argued that the need for co-ordination leads
to highly centralised networks with prominent hubs.57 The claims and proposed reasons
for covert networks being centralised or decentralised, dense or sparse, having brokers
or not, etc. are contradictory58 and can often be seen as artefacts of considering the
covert network as designed rather than created by individuals.59
If the ties of the covert network are considered ‘naturally occurring’ rather than
created by design, the eﬀective capacity of actual covert collaboration ties may be
contingent on other, non-covert ties. One could even argue that overt ties increase
the resilience of covert ties.60 Covert networks may exist in separation from overt
Figure 4. Income-generating activities: Dominant language groups by population subgroup and sex.
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networks, but often covert networks are more or less embedded in or entangled with
non-covert social networks.61 Such embeddedness is even a deﬁning feature of some
covert networks. For example, the operational success of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army was crucially dependent on its embeddedness in civil society and the explicit
reliance on social ties involving non-combatants.62 Similarly, in eastern Congo, most
armed groups depend crucially on civilians for intelligence, logistics, recruitment, poli-
tical communication, and revenue generation.63 The same applies to state security
actors’ engagement in illegal revenue generation activities, such as unauthorised ﬁshing
and logging, the trade in stolen cars, cannabis or prohibited alcohol, or road robbery
and burglary.64 These activities generally involve a range of state and non-state, armed
and non-armed actors that together constitute what might be called a ‘criminal net-
work’. ‘Overt’ actors, such as military oﬃcers, often play a crucial role in these networks,
for instance by ‘protecting’ banditry rings, providing them with arms and ensuring they
can operate freely.65 In our study, the reciprocal nature of the embeddedness of covert
networks in non-covert networks is the conceptual challenge – the non-covert social
support networks cannot be understood or even disentangled from their embeddedness
in covert networks, and vice versa.66
Consequently, we are not necessarily interested in the centrality of particular individuals.
This would conﬂate the diﬀerent types of ties to diﬀerent types of categories of individuals;
nodes have not only diﬀerent formal capacities, but ties are also multiplex.67 While Burt’s
metrics68 for measuring brokerage of focal actors are now standard, these measure
a particular form of brokerage that here would conﬂate the diﬀerent types of ties and
actors. Furthermore, for the purposes of analysing the nominations of the respondents we
want to investigate brokerage that is not contingent on the ties between alters.
In terms of investigating brokerage relative to diﬀerent groups or categories, Gould
and Fernandez developed just such a measure.69 However, their measure only allows for
non-overlapping networks. We therefore adopt the notion of multilevel
embeddedness70 whereby we can ascertain to what extent the person-to-person ties
in A are contingent on the aﬃliations of individuals i∈ to illicit organisations and non-
illicit categories j ∈ G. In Figure 5, the alters of a all belong to the same group as a, hence
providing a with no opportunities for brokering between groups. Ego b, on the other
Figure 5. The duality of multilevel brokerage and overlapping alter dispersion. A multilevel
network71 with inter-personal ties A, personal aﬃliations B, and inter-organisational ties D.
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hand, has alters that not only belong to the same group as b but also provide b with
access to another two groups.
Everett and Borgatti devised a suite of metrics72 designed explicitly for overlapping
group memberships or categories. The key to deﬁning a measure of multilevel
brokerage is to identify the correspondence between representing categories as
attributes of nodes, on the one hand, and attributes as aﬃliations, on the other.
While not a novel idea,73 recent literature74 demonstrates the added insights that the
network two-mode representation of nodal attributes provides. Everett and Borgatti
deﬁne the overlapping categories of actors in the form of a person-by-category
aﬃliation matrix B ¼ bij

 
.75 To account for the variation in diversity of individuals,
the measures are calculated for the row-normalised aﬃliation matrix B ¼ bij
 
. Thus, if
someone has many aﬃliations then they would necessarily have less time and energy
to devote to each one than an individual with a single or a few aﬃliations.
For example, we would tacitly assume that an actor who belongs (or has belonged) to
FARDC, CNDP, and RCD would have a tie to each of these armed groups with a strength
of 1/3. An actor whose military career included only one such aﬃliation, for example
M23, would have a tie to M23 with a strength of 1. While many armed groups in our
sample are rebranded or reconstituted forms of precursory groups, we posit that their
reconstitution and rebranding entailed diﬀering experiences for their members, in terms
of shifting objectives and organisational structures as well as the historical and socio-
political contexts in which they were active. Likewise, despite participating in numerous
armed groups over time, very few demobilised or active combatants have the same
exact history of military membership.
Now, assume that person i is not aﬃliated to armed group j, in other words bij ¼ 0,
but that person i has a friend k, aik ¼ 1, who is aﬃliated to armed group j, bkj > 0. Hence
aik bkj > 0 and i has indirect access to armed group j through k. The matrix C ¼ AB thus is
a person-by-organisation matrix that identiﬁes each individual’s access to diﬀerent
organisational categories. Everett and Borgatti create a normalised matrix P whose pij
element is deﬁned as cij=di, where di ¼
Pn
k¼1 aik is the degree of person i.
76 The element
pij is then the average resource in the alters and can be thought of as the proportion in,
for example, Blau’s H.
Blau’s H measures the dispersion of the diﬀerent types of ego’s alters. For overlapping
categories, it is deﬁned as
Hi ¼ 1
Xm
j¼1
p2ij ;
for each ego i.77 Thus, if ego i has one alter and this alter belongs only to one group j,
then Hi ¼ 0. If ego i has di alters and they all belong only to one group j, then again
Hi ¼ 0. Actor a in Figure 9, for example, has two alters and both of these belong to the
same group and hence Ha ¼ 0. Actor b, on the other hand, has three alters that belong
to three diﬀerent groups giving Hb ¼ 0:61. In our analysis, we study the diversity of ego-
nets of diﬀerent categories of actors, positing that types of actors that have more diverse
ego-nets are those that broker between diﬀerent groups, armed and otherwise.
Another aspect to brokering between groups is the extent to which an actor connects
groups that are diﬀerent from their own. For example, in Figure 9, the alter of b who has two
aﬃliations is not necessarily contributing to brokerage between groups as this actor is
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aﬃliated with a group to which b is already connected; the external tie is redundant given
the other alters. To measure the extent to which an individual thus has personal ties that
connect the actor to diﬀerent groups, Everett and Borgatti derive the number of external ties
from the number of internal ties deﬁned by B.78 The number of internal ties of i is deﬁned as
Ii ¼
Xm
j¼1
bij
Xn
k¼1
aikbkj;
which, in other words, indicates the extent to which the alters of i are aﬃliated with the
same organisations as i. For Ii aﬃliations of the same ‘strength’ as that of i are more
important. The EI Index for overlapping group memberships is then given by
Ei  Ii
Ei þ Ii
¼ 1
2Ii
di
;
and ranges between −1 and 1, from perfect homophily (ego only has ties to those like
itself) to perfect heterophily (ego only has ties to those diﬀerent from itself).
Results
Degree
Breakdowns of the degree distributions by categories revealed no apparent diﬀerences
between egos despite the great overall heterogeneity in the number of alter
nominations.79 Further cross-classiﬁcations do not reveal any other substantial diﬀer-
ences. Thus, purely in terms of (degree) centrality, there do not appear to be any groups
that are better positioned for brokering between other groups.
Homophily
Homophily is one of the most persistent empirical phenomena in social networks. With
the history of conﬂict and ethnic cleavages, there is little reason to assume that homo-
phily would not be an important factor in eastern DRC.
Degree centrality does not elucidate alters’ characteristics. Figure 6 provides a ﬁrst
view of how diﬀerent categories relate to one other, revealing a high degree of homo-
phily. Civilians mostly nominate civilians. Demobilised, technically civilians at present,
nominate civilians but also other demobilised combatants. The active combatants that
they do nominate are most likely members of the armed groups from which they
demobilised (or groups with which these were aﬃliated; see Figure 2). Egos that are
active combatants nominate active combatants from their own armed group but –
mirroring the pattern for civilian and demobilised egos – they also nominate civilians
and demobilised. The (relative) symmetry of the ego-alter ties lends some validity to the
sampling design (for a well-constructed sample, we would expect the egos to balance
the alters80).
Multilevel brokerage – Blau’s H
Figure 7 provides Blau’s H (normalised to Agresti’s IQV) indices81 of multilevel brokerage
by population subgroup and dominant language group, examining access to diverse
armed groups.
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There is remarkably little diﬀerence in access to diﬀerent armed groups, defunct or
currently active, for diﬀerent categories. In particular, there is little diﬀerence between
civilians (top row) and former (second row) and active (third row) combatants, with the
exception of the many civilians without any ties to armed groups. This illustrates the
highly militarised context – the distinction between demobilised and active combatants
is particularly ambiguous.
Whilst the discussion above would suggest that distinct ethno-linguistic subgroups
would have diﬀerent access to armed groups, it seems there is little diﬀerence between
Hunde and Rwandophones. However, there is a large number of armed groups and
Blau’s H does not factor in whether most of the diversity is due to homophily or not. As
discussed above, armed groups are typically dominated by diﬀerent ethno-linguistic
groups, but our respondents have, generally, the same number of ties to each armed
group, accounting for overlapping membership. Thus, none would be in a better posi-
tion to broker between them, whilst civilians would arguably be in the worst position in
terms of such brokerage.
Data: mrSankey • Chart ID: SankeyID812a53f17e07 • googleVis-0.6.1
R version 3.3.0 (2016-05-03) • Google Terms of Use • Documentation and Data Policy
ego Demobilised
Civilian
Demobilised
alter FARDC
alter M23
alter PNC
alter APCLS
alter Nyatura
alter RDF
alter MM.Tsheka.NDC
ego Nyatura
ego FARDC
ego Civilian
ego PNC
ego APCLS
ego M23
Figure 6. Ego-alter assortativity by active armed group.
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Armed groups’ – and their members’ – potential to foment conﬂict is deeply
entangled with access to or exclusion from resources and livelihoods. Thus, individuals
who broker between diﬀerent economic sectors may be as important in terms of conﬂict
resolution as those structurally positioned to broker between armed groups. The right-
hand side panels of Figure 7 focus on access to income-generating activities; the ﬁgure
provides Blau’s H (normalised to Agresti’s IQV) indices of multilevel brokerage by
population subgroup and dominant language group.
Figure 7. Multilevel brokerage for diﬀerent subgroups: Access to armed groups (left panels) and
Access to livelihoods (right panels).
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Similarly to these groups’ access to diverse armed groups, there is little diﬀerence in
the subgroups’ abilities to access various income-generating activities. Civilians, demo-
bilised, and active combatants all secure employment across a variety of markets.
Small yet noticeable numbers of civilians and combatants, however, are employed in
only one sector, thus not able to broker between diﬀerent markets due to their lack of
access to those employed in them. Due to pervasive poverty and insecurity in the
region, and the state’s failure to ensure regular and suﬃcient pay to the police and
armed forces, all of them are potential brokers in access to income-generating activities.
Multilevel brokerage – EI
Knowing whether egos can access various armed groups or livelihoods does not
elucidate whether they are interacting (or collaborating) with alters diﬀerent to them-
selves. To assess this, Figure 8 provides EI indices for the similarity between egos and
their nominated alters in terms of their aﬃliations to all armed groups.
Figure 8. Multilevel brokerage: EI with respect to all armed groups (left panel) and EI with respect to
all occupations (right panel).
GLOBAL CRIME 15
Figure 8 suggests little diﬀerence between the categories. Hunde, however, have
a tentatively higher tendency towards bimodal EI indices, being split between nominating
alters with whom they share armed group aﬃliations and those with whom they do not.
Here, however, the sample is divided between APCLS combatants (majority Hunde) based at
the defence position and those clandestinely working in urban areas. Rwandophones seem
to have a slightly higher tendency to nominate alters who do not share their own military
histories, particularly in reference to those who have demobilised.
The right-hand side panels of Figure 8 assess ego-alter similarity in terms of income-
generating activities. Despite similarities between the categories, the vast majority of civilians
nominated alters pursuing vocations completely diﬀerent from their own. This tendency is not
as noticeable in the alter nominations of active and demobilised combatants. As in access to
diﬀerent armedgroups, demobilisedHunde combatants and active Rwandophone combatants
demonstrate a greater bimodal tendency than active Hunde combatants and demobilised
Rwandophone ones. Rwandophone combatants, predominantly employed in state police and
armed forces, may not be able to access the variety of markets open to Hunde combatants – or
failed to disclose this access. Hunde’s primary membership in a non-state armed group would
enable, and necessitate, the pursuit of various ventures to secure income and their families’
livelihoods. In this respect, they may be better able to broker between people working across
those sectors, be they civilians, demobilised, or other active combatants.
Summary
The analysis reveals a strong tendency towards homophily, between civilians, demobilised,
and active combatants as well as ethno-linguistic groups. The high levels of homophily may
confound Blau’s H. Respondents who have been members of numerous armed groups and
(a) (b)
?
Figure 9. The partial network of the pilot study: Ego-nets of 13 distinct respondents in pilot data
with partial overlap (the dashed line indicates an alter-alter dyad that has not been elicited) (left)
and Spatial embeddedness of pilot actors (right).
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who pursue a breadth of occupations inevitably have access to many groups. Likewise, the
region’s long history of protracted, violent conﬂict translates into a society which remains
extremely militarised today, eﬀacing diﬀerences we would expect to see between those
who are mobilised and those who have demobilised. Membership in some armed groups
even entails aspects of civilian life in cities and villages, in service as well as during leave,
resulting in confusion of clandestine (and not) combatants with civilians.82 The ﬂuidity of
these distinctions is further supported by cyclic demobilisation and remobilisation or
rebranding of armed groups, which likewise aid in explaining active and demobilised
combatants’ memberships in numerous armed groups.
These dynamics also make it diﬃcult for civilians to live and survive in the area as
civilians, disconnected from armed actors and their groups, accounting for their paltry
representation in the sample. To protect themselves and their families, many people
aﬃliate with armed groups or are forced to ﬂee insecurity, becoming internally displaced
or refugees in neighbouring states. Our sampling strategy, however, may likewise
account for the under-representation of civilians.
Rwandophones, overall, appear to have slightly more access to diverse armed groups and
occupations than Hunde, but it is necessary to note that the former comprise both Tutsi and
Hutu ethnic groups. In popular perception, and particularly in terms of the regiments active in
this area, the state security services (FARDC and PNC) are allegedly dominated by Tutsi. The
socio-economic andhistorical cleavages between themandother ethno-linguistic groups in the
area may curtail their abilities to broker between them. Membership in the FARDC and PNC
restricts access to certain ventures pursued by non-state armed groups, and perhaps its
disclosure where it occurs. APCLS, on the other hand, must always engage in various economic
activities in order to survive.
Complete network analysis
To parse homophily from diﬀerential connectivity and access in the multilevel embedded-
ness framework detailed above, we apply an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to
data including the alter-alter ties that are not represented in Figure 4. We may conceive of
the totality of the sample as a partial observation on a multilevel network83 using A and B –
deﬁned as in Egos and alters above – with the additional adjacency matrix D deﬁning the
ties between armed groups. This allows us to model the totality of ties using a multilevel
exponential random graph model (MERGM).84 Drawing on Frank and Strauss,85 Wang et al.
specify a number of diﬀerent statistics z on the diﬀerent combinations of ties in A, B, andD.86
These statistics capture interactions between diﬀerent types of ties that correspond to
meaningful dependencies. We will return to the explicit forms for these interactions after
having presented the networks of the subsample.
Pilot data
A subset of the 396-respondent survey was part of the pilot study carried out outside Goma in
2016,87 yielding the 13 ego-nets in Figure 9 (there are nine components after entity resolu-
tion). The sociogram has one annotated example of a dyad where information is missing by
design. This is a partial observation on our one-mode network A. The spatial embedding of the
network (right panel of Figure 9) suggests that ties cluster geographically.
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We identiﬁed 26 distinct armed groups that are represented as an aﬃliation
network (B). The network of non-negative ties88 between the armed groups in the
pilot data89 is a subgraph of Figure 2. Out of the revenue-generating activities
reported across the study (see Figure 4) we identiﬁed 39 types to include in our
analysis after excluding categories captured by armed group aﬃliation (e.g. ‘Police
oﬃcer’ and ‘Soldier’) and those not relating to primary forms of
employment (‘Refugee’, ‘Companion (sex trade)’, and ‘Other’). We represent liveli-
hoods of individuals as an additional person-by-livelihood aﬃliation network.
Combining A, B, and D yields the multilevel network representation in Figure 10.
Model speciﬁcation
One-mode statistics z Að Þ and z Dð Þ are typically deﬁned as in Snijders et al.90 For example,
endogenous degree-based eﬀects are captured by (functions) of counts of diﬀerent types of
Figure 10. Pilot data represented as multilevel network. Armed groups (square, yellow, size
associated with degree) and people (men, blue; woman, red; civilians round; demobilised, triangles).
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stars.91 Typically, k-stars (Figure 11(a)) are weighted together using geometrically decreasing
weight to form one statistic for the entire degree distribution. These types of conﬁgurations
may, for example, model mechanisms such as the rich get richer, whereby some nodes tend
Figure 11. Examples of network statistics: One-mode network and multilevel network conﬁgurations
in MERGM. Round nodes represent people, square nodes armed groups, six-sided polygons repre-
sent livelihoods, and triangles speciﬁcally refer to demobilised combatants.
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to accumulate network ties by virtue of already having many network ties. One-mode ERGM
also typically comprise statistics that correspond to triadic closure and mechanisms such as
friends of my friends tend to also be friends. The alternating triangle statistic (Figure 11(b))
models themarginal eﬀect on the (conditional) probability that two people will be connected
for every additional friend they have in common.
Wang et al. deﬁne dependence assumptions and associated statistics z Bð Þ for bipar-
tite ERGM.92 In our analysis we have chosen not to model aﬃliations with armed groups
and livelihoods but instead treat these as ﬁxed explanatory factors, in which case
bipartite statistics are not needed.
Cross-level brokerage or cross-level assortative mixing (Figure 11(g,o)) allows us to
study the association between one-mode ties and aﬃliations. A positive tendency for
these conﬁgurations would mean that individuals with many personal ties also tend to
be aﬃliated with many armed groups (Figure 11(g)) or many livelihoods (Figure 11(o)),
respectively. In this sense, this would mean that there were individuals that indirectly
connected many people with many diﬀerent groups. For armed groups we also include
the assortative eﬀect (Figure 11(i)) which models the extent to which actors that are
members of many armed groups are also likely to know each other.
Cross-level closure, in the form of a multilevel triangle (Figure 11(k,p)) can be seen
as a reﬁnement of homophily. With a positive eﬀect for this cross-level closure, we
would infer that people belonging to the same armed group (Figure 11(k)) or
livelihood (Figure 11(p)) would be more likely to be connected through a one-
mode tie. The exact mechanisms behind this eﬀect could vary depending on the
speciﬁc context. It can be a matter of latent homophily on shared ideals and beliefs,
propinquity, social foci,93 etc. If two individuals had served in the same armed group
together, they would have shared experiences, but this would also mean that they
would have had the opportunity to get to know each other in the social setting of
the armed group.94
Crucial to our understanding of the social fabric in eastern Congo is the complexity of
relations between organisations or armed groups (see Figure 2). Knowing that a is active
in the M23 and that b is active in the FDLR entails knowing they belong to opposing
organisations and may even have fought one another. If, on the other hand, one person
was a member of the RCD and the other was a member of the CNDP (RCD’s successor),
this might mean that they are more likely to be directly tied because the armed groups
are connected (through shared goals, personnel, etc.). The tie between these two people
would thus complete the multilevel four-cycle of Figure 11(n). The mechanisms behind
this tie-formation eﬀect may diﬀer from the multilevel triangle (Figure 11(k,p)) as
propinquity and the opportunity to meet are not directly expressed in the four-cycle.
Nodal properties may be taken into account and included as exogenous predictors of
tie-presence. For example, we include an interaction of being female with having a tie
(Figure 11(c)) to test whether women tend to have more or less ties than males, all else
considered. To test whether people belonging to the same category are more likely to
have a tie between them as compared to category-spanning ties we include a statistic
for same sex (or female-female) ties (Figure 11(d)). Similarly, for demobilised combatants
we include a main eﬀect (Figure 11(e)) and a homophily eﬀect (Figure 11(f)). To
distinguish between the role of aﬃliations with armed groups for active and demobi-
lised combatants, we include the interaction eﬀect ‘StarP-AG demobilised’ (Figure 11(h)).
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A positive parameter for this eﬀect would mean that demobilised combatants would
have more social support ties, or be more readily sought out for support, if they have
access to many armed groups.
The multilevel ERGM deﬁnes a model for the network that has the probability mass
function
p A; B;Djθð Þ ¼ exp θTAz Að Þ þ θ
T
Dz Dð Þ þ θ
T
Bz Bð Þ þ θ
T
ABz A; Bð Þ þ θ
T
BDz B;Dð Þ þ θ
T
ABDz A; B;Dð Þ  ψ θð Þ
 
;
where θ ¼ θTA; θ
T
D; θ
T
B; θ
T
AB; θ
T
BD; θ
T
ABD
 T
is a vector of statistical parameters weighting
together the importance of the diﬀerent types of network conﬁgurations, and ψ θð Þ is
a normalising constant. A positive (negative) parameter means that there is evidence for
a systematic tendency towards (against) the formation of the associated statistic.
Analysis of partially observed network data
In our network some ties are missing by design: ties between alters of diﬀerent egos are
only elicited whenever the alter sets overlap. While we were able to draw conclusions
about ‘group-brokerage’, identifying individual brokers presents issues when networks
are partially observed. Consider for example any measure based on reach (e.g. between-
ness), which will always be underestimated if there are unobserved ties. Centrality
measures, in general, are sensitive to missing data.95
The tiesof the respondents and the tiesbetween their alters are all knownanddenotedbyW.
Ties between alters of diﬀerent egos are denoted by U. For any realisation u on U, we can
recombine the graph A ¼ W; uð Þ into a complete population and calculate the betweenness
scores and othermetrics. We can estimate anymetric for the complete graph by averaging over
potential outcomes of U. Assuming that A follows an ERGM, Koskinen et al.96 derive the correct
distribution for U conditional on us having observedW. This imputation scheme has later been
extended to multilevel networks.97
MERGM results
We assume a MERGM with the eﬀects of Figure 11 with the addition of a distance eﬀect
following Daraganova et al.98 and Koskinen and Lomi.99 We use armed group non-
negative ties as a predictor, rather than an outcome, kept ﬁxed through the estimation.
Similarly, we model the social support network A conditional on the aﬃliations given the
paucity of memberships and the personal histories of the actors.
We followed the inference procedure in Koskinen et al.,100using 30,000 iterations in themain
algorithm, with 50,000 updating steps for producing each auxiliary variable. For updates of
missing tie-variables we used 28,000 updates. Summaries of the posteriors are given in Table 1.
Model I includes one-mode eﬀects and multilevel eﬀects for armed group aﬃliation.
The alternating star and triangle eﬀects suggest that the degree distribution is relatively
homogenous and that having indirect contacts (providers of socio-economic support)
increases the likelihood of actors being directly tied, respectively. There is evidence of
homophily on sex (Female homophily) and being demobilised (Demob homophily) but
both categories seem to be less central (Female main and Demob main, respectively).
There is a strong eﬀect of distance and, using the interpretation of Daraganova et al.,101
we might posit that tie-probability decreases with distance according to a power-law.
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Those aﬃliated with many armed groups have more contacts (Star2P-AG) but not to
one other (L3AG-P-AG). Two actors being members of the same armed group increases
the likelihood that they are connected (Triangle AG-P-AG), while there is no evidence for
alignment between armed group ties and personal support ties (C4P-AG).
In Model II we add the interaction eﬀect of being demobilised and being aﬃliated
with many armed groups (Star2P-AG demob). This eﬀect is positive and its inclusion
explains away the base-line eﬀect of having many armed group aﬃliations (Star2P-AG).
Actors who engage in diverse revenue-generating activities have fewer contacts (Star2P-
Livelihood) but shared livelihoods increase the likelihood of a tie between two actors.
Accounting for the role of demobilised combatants in Model II we can conclude that
while Model I provides weak evidence (C4P-AG is positive with 0.82 posterior probability) of
alignment between armed group ties and personal support ties, and strong evidence of
membership in many armed groups making actors more connected, both eﬀects disappear
when taking into account whether those actors are militarily active or not. Armed groups
thus act as foci where personal ties are forged and individuals do not form ties because they
share common political goals or aims, as represented by their armed groups being aligned
(the absence of an eﬀect for C4P-AG). Being aﬃliatedwithmany armed groupsmakes actors
less likely to be central in the personal support network unless they are demobilised
combatants, in which case it makes themmore central. A possible explanation is that active
armed group membership monopolises allegiances and only upon demobilisation can one
draw on social capital accrued across multiple foci.
Accounting for livelihoods, we can conclude that revenue-generating activities do not
facilitate connections to other people, only to those with whom actors share livelihoods. The
jack-of-all-trades is central in the personal support network only insofar as they may connect to
many people engaged in similar revenue-generating activities, but not by virtue of their
versatility in and of itself.
Table 1. Estimation results: Posterior summaries of parameters in a MERGM ﬁtted to pilot data.
Model I Model II
95% CI 95% CI
mean sd 0.025 0.975 mean sd 0.025 0.975
Parameter
One-mode
edges 0.959 0.97 −0.781 2.894 1.338 0.973 −0.528 3.328
Alternating star −2.365 0.253 −2.861 −1.906 −2.364 0.252 −2.878 −1.882
Alternating triangle 2.848 0.152 2.559 3.157 2.798 0.159 2.485 3.1
Female main −0.177 0.158 −0.491 0.116 −0.17 0.156 −0.478 0.146
Female homophily 0.76 0.257 0.242 1.262 0.792 0.27 0.268 1.338
Demob main −0.423 0.148 −0.716 −0.138 −0.876 0.229 −1.352 −0.459
Demob homophily 0.71 0.258 0.204 1.21 0.91 0.302 0.319 1.524
Geo distance −0.232 0.034 −0.299 −0.167 −0.222 0.036 −0.292 −0.154
Multilevel
Star2P-AG 0.282 0.099 0.086 0.479 0.184 0.109 −0.043 0.392
Star2P-AG demob 0.149 0.056 0.043 0.261
L3AG-P-AG −0.118 0.039 −0.198 −0.044 −0.11 0.042 −0.194 −0.027
Triangle AG-P-AG 0.582 0.113 0.354 0.807 0.663 0.129 0.41 0.913
L3P-AG-AG −0.03 0.022 −0.073 0.014 −0.02 0.021 −0.057 0.024
C4P-AG 0.082 0.085 −0.088 0.249 0.029 0.098 −0.169 0.215
Star2P-Livelihood −0.016 0.005 −0.026 −0.006
Triangle Live-P-Live 0.876 0.16 0.555 1.191
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In the course of estimation, the realisations u on U are drawn from the distribution
conditional on the sampled data. To check the veracity of the model, it is convention to
investigate its goodness-of-ﬁt (GOF) through simulation.102 We follow Koskinen et al.103
and compare the augmented observed data with replicates from the model. Figure 12
demonstrates a good ﬁt of the degree distribution.
Brokerage in population graph
The MERGM analysis allows us to ascertain the factors associated with personal support
ties while controlling for a variety of other factors. Any individual actor will however
instantiate a variety of diﬀerent attributes and the imputed networks allow us to identify
people in our sample that act as multilevel brokers.104
Two aﬃliations that represent a particularly diﬃcult relationship are the APCLS and
the M23, respectively Hunde- and Tutsi-dominated armed groups. Aside from the ethno-
linguistic groups’ historical cleavages of political and socio-economic competition and
exclusion, the armed groups have also been in direct conﬂict on multiple occasions, and
in diﬀerent incarnations. Unsurprisingly, there is no-one who has been a member of
both in the pilot dataset. Figure 12 provides the posterior predicted ‘brokerage scores’
(ordered) for the individuals in the network, based on the imputed population graphs
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Figure 12. Goodness-of-ﬁt: Comparison of the ﬁtted model to augmented observed network for
degree distribution. Posterior predicted brokerage scores for brokering between M23 and APCLS
conditional on there existing at least one path. Plot ordered according to posterior median score.
Inﬁnite distances set to n. Egos represented as red dots.
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(for the 42% of graphs with a path between M23 and APCLS). The scores are calculated
as the minimum path length from the focal actor to a member of the APCLS plus the
minimum path length from the focal actor to a member of the M23.
The top three median brokers include, respectively, the actor with the most observed
ties (a demobilised combatant) but also two actors with low degrees (a civilian and an
active combatant). None of them are directly aﬃliated with either the M23 or the APCLS.
Their varied portfolios of experiences allow them to engage with diﬀerent groups of
people, echoing the tentative conclusions of the ego-net analysis.
Summary and future directions
We investigated multilevel brokerage, the extent to which individuals may provide
access to diﬀerent groups through personal support networks in conﬂict-aﬀected east-
ern Congo. We found only tentative diﬀerences between Hunde and Rwandophone
actors but the diﬀerences are also confounded to some extent by ethnicity –
Rwandophones comprise two often discordant ethnic groups, Tutsi and Hutu, whose
belonging and citizenship rights have been violently contested for decades.
The second analysis highlights the complexity of the social context. We build on the
concept of multilevel brokerage introduced in the ﬁrst analysis and posit a model that
reﬁnes homophily by investigating how the personal support network is embedded in
the greater political context. It is clear that demobilised combatants overall broker
between the diﬀerent layers by virtue of having access to many armed groups through
previous careers whilst not being restricted by membership in any single current active
group. When we identify speciﬁc individuals in our dataset that are more likely to be
brokers between the extremes of the conﬂict spectrum – and thus crucial to dynamics of
conﬂict as well as peace – the picture is more nuanced. These individuals are civilians,
demobilised, and active combatants. The latter two have complex portfolios of armed
group aﬃliation, linking the domain of the state with a wide range of other groups and
their members – active and demobilised combatants. The two analyses utilise diﬀerent
albeit complimentary segments of the dataset; further insights may be obtained from
scaling up the second analysis to include all respondents.
Our analyses indicate that the highly militarised context of the region makes distinctions
between active and demobilised combatants, and in some cases even civilians, tenuous and
ambiguous. As a result of protracted and intractable conﬂict, most individuals were or remain
militarised in some form or another. In addition, armed groups often recruit in the same limited
geographical area as where they operate, implying many people have family members, former
classmates, colleagues, and neighbours serving in armed groups. Hence, we identiﬁed few
diﬀerences in social support patterns between civilians, demobilised, and active combatants. In
particular, it appears that the recourse for civilians is to aﬃliate themselves – albeit not directly –
with armed groups for protection or take up arms themselves. These self-reinforcing mechan-
isms eﬀectively remove civilians, individuals unconnected to armed groups, from the context
whilst exacerbating the institutionalisation of armed groups as means and method of political,
economic, and social regulation.
These dynamics, indicated and elaborated upon in our analyses, demonstrate the
embeddedness of armed groups in local societies and economies. Our conclusions
suggest that the embeddedness of armed groups is so intractable because of the
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diversity and complexity of its nature – ‘covert’ networks are impossible to disentangle
from non-covert ones. Likewise, connections between demobilised and active comba-
tants to at least nominally overt actors like state representatives and businesspeople are
crucial to understanding the dynamics of regional conﬂict – and imperative to its
resolution. To achieve such understanding, so-called covert networks must be contex-
tualised in the greater networks, overt and not, of which they are part.
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Figure A1. Degree distributions of alters by population subgroup, language group, and sex.
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Table A1. Approximate size, origin, and successor of armed groups in and around Masisi territory and used in Figure 2 (estimated for 2013).
Armed Group Troop Size Created Successors Predecessors Splinters
APCLS 1000 2008 N/A PARECO, MM Janvier/PCLS APCLS-Rénové (Mapenzi & Poyo)
Guides-MAC 200 2010 N/A Guides FDC-Guides
FDC-Guides 100 2012 N/A Guides Guides-MAC
FDLR (FOCA) 2000 2000 CNRD ALiR RUD, Soki, Mandevu
RUD-Urunana 400 2004 FPP(H) FDLR N/A
FDLR-SOKI 50 2006 ‘Kasongo’ FDLR N/A
FPD-Shetani 100 2009 Mayi-Mayi Charles FARDC N/A
Coalition Raia Mukombozi 300 2012 RM Donat/Ngandu and others Mudundu 40, Raia Mutomboki, Mayi-Mayi Padiri RM Mabala, RM Maheshe, RM Makombo
M23 1300 2012 CNDP, RCD-Goma Bosco group
Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua 300 2002 N/A Mayi-Mayi Padiri, Katuku, Batiri Maachano, Limenzi, Delphin, Shalio
Nduma Defence of Congo 400 2009 NDC-Rénové Mayi-Mayi Kasikila NDC-Rénové
Nyatura-FDIPC 200 2013 FARDC, FPP(H) PARECO? FPP
Nyatura-FODP 200 2012 Muchoma, Nyatura-Domi PARECO Nyatura Ngwiti, Vutura
Nyatura-MPA 200 2011 FARDC, FPP(H) PARECO? FPP
Nyatura-FDDH 200 2011 Groupe de Securité, Nyatura-Kavumbi PARECO Nyatura-Bigirabagabo
Nyatura-Delta 500 2011 N/A PARECO N/A
Nyatura-Noheri 100 2013 FDDH, APRDC/CMC PARECO
RUC-Bapfakururimi 200 2011 Nyatura Domi, Nyatura Muchoma PARECO
URDC 200 2012 FARDC? RCD-K/ML
UPCP-Lafontaine 200 2011 UPDI, Mazembe, FPP-Kabido PARECO
FARDC 100,000 2003 N/A FAC, FAZ
CNDP - 2004/6 FARDC/M23 RCD-Goma Busumba LDF
Busumba LDF 50 2012 Nyatura Jean-Marie RCD-Goma, CNDP
Source: See note 33.
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Table A2. Armed group membership by language group and sex.
Armed Group Sex Kihunde Kinde Lingala Mashi Rwandophone Other Total
RCD W 8 1 37 46
M 7 1 1 41 50
CNDP W 2 1 36 39
M 6 1 36 43
Nyatura W 1 1 4 6
M 2 1 3
MM Janvier W 10 1 1 12
M 28 1 1 1 1 32
MM Kifuafua W 4 4
M 15 1 16
AFDL W 1 1 9 11
M 3 1 1 20 25
RPA W 5 5
M 1 11 12
PARECO W 2 1 3
M 9 1 2 12
MAGRIVI W 1 1 2
M 6 2 8
FDLR W 1 1 2
M 1 1
MM Bangilima W
M 1 1
MM Tsheka NDC W 1 1
M 1 1
MM Shetani W
M 1 1 2
MM La Fontaine W
M 1 1 2
TPD W 1 1
M 8 8
RDF W
M 1 1
APCLS W 3 2 5
M 22 1 3 26
M23 W 3 3
M 3 3
FAZ W 1 1
M 1 1
FAC W
M 2 1 3
FARDC W 2 1 2 5
M 3 3
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